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The latter part of the twentieth century has seen a marked acceleration in 
the rate of progress in the area of transplant research . The world of 1998 is 
one in which it is possible to transplant hearts, kidneys, lungs, livers, 
corneas and even neural cells from one human body to another. 
Transplants involving some organs from animals, and even synthetic 
organs, have also been achieved, with beneficial and sometimes spectacular 
results. It is therefore not surprising that, since Dr. Christiaan Barnard 
performed the world's first heart transplant operation just .over 30 years ago 
and placed the issue firmly in the public eye, a great many questions 
concerning the ethics of such procedures have been raised and actively 
debated. From our perspective at the end of the twentieth century, it would 
appear that the first exultant acclamations of these life-saving and life-
enhancing procedures have given way to a more circumspect examination 
of the potential disadvantages which might accompany their 
implementation. This clearly has significant implications for the rights of 
the donor to bodily integrity and respect, and the rights of the recipient to 
avail of the most advanced treatments for his or her particular condition. If 
the issue of adult human transplants has been a source of disagreement in 
ethical and medical circles in recent years, it is clearly overshadowed by 
the degree of controversy which surrounds the issue of fetal tissue 
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transplants . For here we are not dealing with the adult human person who 
is the proud possessor of long-recognized societal and legal rights but with 
a class of persons whose standing has been severely diminished by decades 
of legal and political indifference and hostility. Thus, although the issue of 
fetal ti ssue transplants may not appear to be related to the issue of abortion, 
this article will attempt to demon strate how many aspects of the latter 
debate are perceptible in the former. A number of relevant opinions on the 
matter will be reviewed, many of which relate to the findings of the Human 
Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research (HFTTR) Panel , convened at the 
National Institutes of Health in 1988 . In addition, we will investigate 
whether, in view of the substantial body of abortion-related research 
currently being conducted, there exists a morally acceptable and 
medically/economica lly viable method of us ing human fetal ti ssue to aid in 
transplant research. 
HFTTR - The Report 
The HFTTR panel first met in public sess ion in September of 1988 
to di scuss the ethics of fetal ti ssue transplants, six months after the U.S. 
Assistant Secretary for Health, Robert Windom, had declared a moratorium 
on any federal funding of such transplants involving ti ssue obtained from 
induced abortions. Mr. Windom posed a number of questions to the pane l, 
most of which concerned the re lationship between the collection of fetal 
tissue a nd the abortion procedures from which that tissue was obtained. By 
December of that same year, after hearing legal , ethical and sociological 
testimony from invited speakers and public interest groups, the panel filed 
its report . One of its authors, James C hildress, notes in hi s account of the 
proceedings that the panel advocated a lifting of the morato rium on federal 
funding for fetal tissue tran splants and the implementation of a number of 
"safeguards" which it believed would "separate as much as possible the 
pregnant woman ' s deci s ion to abort from her deci s ion to donate fetal tissue 
following the abortion ." J In addition, the panel believed that these 
regulations would prevent any complicity on the part of ti ssue collection 
agencies in the preceding act of abortion. Of the twenty-one panel 
members (ethicists, lawyers, biomedical researchers, clinical physicians, 
public policy experts and religious leaders), four filed dissents . This 
dissent was based on a belief in the immorality of abortion and in the 
related immorality of complicity with thi s moral evil. We must therefore 
examine in greater detail this question of complicity. 
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HFTTR - The Dissent 
James Bopp, Jr., a dissenting member of the panel , describes in The 
Fetal Tissue Issue how the question of complicity with past abortions has 
arisen because of principles enunciated during the Nuremberg War Crimes 
Trial, concerning the doctors who used human remains obtained from 
concentration camps for their various experiments. These doctors were 
condemned for having " taken a consenting part,,2 in the crimes carried out 
at the camps inasmuch as they were fully aware of these atrocities and their 
research benefited as a result of these acts . By way of comparison, Bopp 
describes how, in 1988, Dr. Curt Freed spent four days in an abortion clinic 
searching for "acceptable" fetal tissue for what was to become the first fetal 
tissue transplant. During this time, Dr. Freed was "examining and 
reassembling fetal remains to be sure abortions were complete, a task 
normally performed by clinic personnel. '" For Bopp, such actions 
represent clear participation in and agreement with the abortion procedure 
itself, no different from the complicity of the German doctors in the death 
of camp prisoners. 
Role of Intermediary 
In his article, Childress refers to the finding of the Polkinghorne 
report (in the U.K.) which called for the introduction of an " intermediary" 
collector or processor as a "method to separate the practice of abortion 
from the use of fetal tissue ." 4 But Bopp contends that such a provision 
would not eliminate the complicity of the researcher. If the act itself is an 
immoral one, then the provision of a middle man does not create "a break 
in the chain of ethical respon sibility"S in the same way that the hiring of a 
"hit man" does not break the chain of ethical responsibility for the person 
who hires him for the purpose of murder. 
Childress notes that James Burtchaell (another dissenting panel 
member) perceives moral complicity in an agent whose actions "involve an 
association that both yields benefits and conveys approval. Even if the 
agent expressly condemns the wrong actions, his or her association 
symbolically eviscerates those condemnations.,,6 Burtchaell holds that the 
researcher, in "entering into an institutionalized partnership with the 
abortion industry as a suppl ier of reference .. . becomes compl icit, though 
after the fact, with the abortions that have expropriated the ti ssue for his or 
her purposes."? For his part, Childress attempts to show the unworkability 
of this definition (in a kind of reductio ad absurdum) by widening the scope 
of this " institutionalized" symbolic association and speculating that, 
according to Bopp and Burtchaell, everyone from transplant recipients to 
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taxpayers would somehow be complicitous in the federally-funded practice 
of HFTTR. John Robertson (a majority report signatory) makes a similar 
claim by extending this "complicity" to the grocer who sells food to the 
abortionist. This argument patently ignores the all-important criterion of 
proximate cause. Bopp points out that there is a substantial difference 
between the grocer who accepts everyone ' s money (including the 
abortionist) and the researcher who is " logically proximate" to those 
performing the abortion. Moreover, it would be a more apt analogy if the 
grocer were the recipient of illegal liquor (e.g ., moonshine) from a criminal 
via a middle man. The grocer would then be complicitous with criminal 
activity if he were to knowingly sell the liquor. 
Robertson points to the example of body parts and organs which 
are obtained from murder and accident victims and attempts to outline a 
parallel with the researcher collecting fetal tissue from an aborted child.s 
According to Bopp, this analogy is flawed since it does not imply any 
approval of murder for the doctor to use the organs of a murder victim. If 
the doctor had knowledge of the murder in advance or had some 
arrangement with a serial murderer to receive the bodies of his victims, 
then a clear charge of complicity would apply here. But as he is unaware 
of the actions of the murderer, he must surely be innocent of any 
cooperation with those actions. Unlike abortion, murder is not a regulated, 
approved and predictable practice. It remains a random , though brutal , 
action (accidents are similarly unpredictable and random). But, as Bopp 
theorizes, what if this were not so? What if one could know when and 
where a murder was about to occur and could arrange to collect the bodies 
afterwards? He asks: " What if the murderer were known, and an 
intermediary rented space in a building owned by the murderer in order to 
more efficiently collect and process human tissue?,,9 In these cases (among 
others) the complicity would be clear and the analogy with abortion proven. 
Additionally, the law might declare murder to be legal , posing the troubling 
question : " Would the fact that the practice is not proscribed by law make it 
j usti ftable?" I 0 
Legality and Morality 
This excessive reliance on legality as the basis of morality is what 
led the authors of the majority report to deny that there was any valid 
analogy between the medical use of Holocaust victims ' bodies and the 
practice of abortion for transplant purposes: " If the complicity claim is 
doubtful when the underlying immorality of the act is clear, as with Nazi-
produced data or transplants from murder victims, it is considerably 
weakened when the act making the benefit possible is legal and its 
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immorality is vigorously debated, as is the case with abortion." JJ Thus the 
mistake of elevating "legal" acts (in the "hierarchy" of morality) over those 
which are "vigorously debated" is painfully demonstrated when one 
considers that the Nazi regime considered all that it did to be in full accord 
with its own law. Nor is it the case that Nazi eugenic and social 
experiments are beyond "vigorous debate", even today. The existence of 
those who adhere to anti-semetic, eugenic or neo-Nazi beliefs testifies to 
that regrettable fact. 
The majority vigorously objected to comparisons between the Nazi 
death camp regime and the practice of fetal tissue transplantation . Dr. 
Moscona forcefully asserted: "The Holocaust was not a medical research 
project to help Parkinson patients and rescue infants from fatal diseases." J2 
In reply to this, one must remember that the Nazis themselves did believe 
that their actions would benefit German society through what Bopp calls 
"racial hygienics." Thus it is far too simplistic to view those experiments 
as nothing more than an exercise in cruelty. Those German doctors, like 
the researchers of today, would have vehemently denied that they possessed 
anything other than altruistic motives, and this is perhaps the most chilling 
aspect of their crimes. Moscona also believes that the central objective of 
the Nazis was not the implementation of experimental "cruelties" but the 
ideology which "denied human freedom and enslaved it to medieval hatreds 
in the name of world conquest" J3 and which "[denied] human rights to one 
class of citizens, unlocked oppression and provided the warrant for 
genocide." J4 But similarly no one would maintain that the objective of the 
abortion movement is the procuring of fresh tissue for transplantation. 
Rather, it is the realization of an ideology which denies human rights to a 
class of citizens (i.e. , the unborn) and treats humans as expendable in the 
name of some greater societal "good ." The Nazi analogy is thus both 
accurate and appropriate. For Moscana, " Equating freely surrendered 
abortus cells with tormented people poi soned with lethal insecticides defies 
reason and outrages morality." JS Here, he has confused the role of the 
subjects by asserting that the "cells" are freely surrendered . But by whom? 
Not by the unborn fetus , certainly, who is forcibly poisoned by lethal 
substances of another kind. Thus the denial of the analogy is once again in 
vain. 
Effect of Fetal Tissue Transplants on Abortion Decisions 
The panel also considered the possible effects of the avai labi I ity of 
fetal tissue transplants on the decision of a woman to obtain an abortion . 
The majority believed that it was possible to separate these two factors 
through a system of legal sanctions and regulations which would remove 
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the incentives to seek an abortion for transplant purposes. Robertson 
argues that the provision of federal funding for fetal tissue harvesting 
would not convey an approval of abortion, any more than the funding of 
kidney transplants encourages the occurrence of murder, suicide or 
accidents. However, a critical di stinction exists here: Whereas the above 
three phenomena are by no means approved of by society (recent legal 
changes in Oregon notwithstanding), the practice of abortion is not only 
tolerated but has been actively encouraged through the law since the Roe v. 
Wade decision of 1973. Therefore, as Bopp observes, the lack of legal 
restraints against the practice " makes the moral wrong of abortion 
susceptible to promotion. ,, '6 The panel seems to believe that federal 
funding of the tissue collection process would be the best way to insure the 
separation (what they call "a symbolic gulf') between the decision to abort 
and the decision to provide fetal tissue. Closely regulated, they argue, the 
HFTTR process is value-neutral. It neither approves nor disapproves of the 
practice of abortion but merely makes use of fetuses which were destined to 
be destroyed anyway. Under the panel ' s guidelines, a woman would not be 
asked for her consent to donate to donate fetal tissue until she had decided 
to obtain an abortion: " no information about the donation and use of fetal 
tissue in research should be provided prior to the pregnant woman's 
decision to abort, unless she specifically requests that information .,, ' 7 This 
provision, along with others which stipulate that "no fees [should] be paid 
to the woman to donate [fetal tissue]"' 8 is aimed at preventing abortions 
which would not have otherwise occurred. The naivete of this belief 
becomes evident when one considers both the difficulty of identifying any 
one "moment of decision" and the factors involved in the decision to abort. 
Bopp cites many studies which show that " most women are ambivalent 
about abortion . . . a large percentage of women end up changing their minds 
at least once, with five percent doing so after making the abortion 
appointment. ,, '9 A study by Kathleen Nolan has found that since " women 
do take the perceived needs of others into account, as a major and often 
determinative factor, the potential for influence on individual [elective 
abortion] decisions is real." Thus, the general knowledge of the existence 
of the procedure may well tip the balance in favor of abortion, a fact 
implicitly recognized by Childress when he accepts that HFTTR " may 
reduce feelings of guilt and tragedy"}O associated with abortion. He relates 
the story of a phone call from a man whose wife was about to have an 
abortion. They wanted, he said, to donate fetal tissue in order to " reduce 
their troublesome thought about abortion .,,21 Though Childress is unclear 
as to the motives of the woman in question, it is not difficult to see how 
other women in the emotional upheaval of crisis pregnancy may well seek 
an "altruistic" solution as a way of lessening deep feelings of unease and 
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guilt. Substantial research on post-abortion patients, such as that conducted 
by David Reardon (author of the excellent Aborted Women, Silent No 
More) shows that many women do not feel that they were sufficiently 
informed or free of pressure when they made their abortion decision . In 
light of this, the panel's implied view of abortion as a clearly defined and 
emotionally uncomplicated choice strikes one as singularly ill-informed. 
Parental Authority 
In spite of the concerns raised by the dissent, the panel majority 
believed that the method of express donation (as opposed to " presumed" 
donation) enacted by the pregnant woman after the abortion decision was 
most appropriate to society ' s traditions and practices, e.g., the Uniform 
Anatomical Gift Act and other federal research stipulations. Bopp and 
Burtchaell opposed this finding, believing that when a pregnant woman 
"resolves to destroy her offspring, she has abdicated her office and duty as 
the guardian of her offspring, and thereby forfeits her tutelary powers."n 
The majority objected that the decision to abort does not automatically 
invalidate the mother's moral standing "as the primary decisionmaker about 
the disposition of fetal remains, including the donation of fetal tissue for 
research.,,23 Thus, despite the fact that she directly intends the death of her 
unborn child, "she still has a special connection with the fetus and she has a 
legitimate interest in its disposition and use.,,14 The panel cited legal 
examples where parents who are suspected of or have admitted to the death 
of their child by abuse are permitted to make proxy decisions regarding use 
of that child ' s organs. Without addressing this latter claim (which is 
difficult to judge because of its unspecific nature) it seems difficult to 
justify the notion of " legitimate interest" in the case of a mother who has 
chosen to abort. The law (and moral law) clearly does not consider 
parenthood an absolute " right" , independent of all other considerations. 
Rather, it is a sacred trust which depends for its legitimacy on the maxim 
(enunciated by Hadley Arkes in The Fetal Tissue Issue) that all " [parental] 
decisions are governed by an overriding concern for the health and well-
being of the child .,,25 Hence, the legal system can supersede parental 
authority to provide life-saving procedures when necessary and the moral 
law can declare illicit any attempt to conceive children outside of the 
marital act. Both underscore the belief that the rights of parenthood are 
contingent on the welfare of the child . 
Hadley Arkes argues cogently that a mother who has decided to 
abort has weighed her personal interests against those of her child and 
determined that her interests have overridden any claim on the part of her 
child to preserve its life. According to Arkes, " it would seem to be clear 
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beyond shading that the woman has made a decision not to be a 'mother ' in 
any sense that defines the office and the relation. ,,26 She will not allow the 
child to be born, sustained, nurtured or protected. Nor will she allow others 
to provide that care. Arkes finds it hard to imagine "a situation in which a 
woman would sever more decisively her connections to the child and the 
claim to stand, in the life of that child, in the position of a " mother" or even 
a guardian .,,27 Yet this claim is precisely what the panel majority would 
uphold via the significance they attach to the "special connection" between 
the mother and the child she is about to destroy. On the contrary, Arkes 
maintains, the mother has the authority to make a "gift" of her miscarried 
child's tissue only because her intentions were always directed towards the 
health and well-being of that child while it was alive. Arkes notes that the 
conclusion that a mother can forfeit the right of donation through her 
abortion decision may seem "a bit jarringly out of line with the currents of 
our time,,28 but observes that the "currents of our time" are themselves 
somewhat bizarre. The era of Roe v Wade , euthanasia and organ transplant 
developments has seen the emergence of the notion of property rights over 
another's body and over its disposal. These rights, which were not 
recognized at the time of Blackstone (theft of a corpse was considered " no 
felony, unless some of the gravecloths be stolen with it,,29) are now widely 
debated and legislated for. Of significance in this debate is the person ' s 
reasonable rights of property over his own person, "which Locke regarded 
as the foundation of all other claims of property. ,,·10 Neither are these rights 
lost at death, a fact which often escapes those who regard the deceased 
fetus as a "commodity." "The source of rights . .. must lie in principles that 
are not material in nature. Those rights do not vanish upon death because 
the principles themselves do not decompose. ".1 1 
The Need for Fetal Tissue Transplant Research 
In spite of the arguments outlined above, proponents of HFTTR 
justify its implementation on the basis that there simply exists too great a 
human need for such transplants for research to be halted. In truth, it 
cannot be denied that research (even of an immoral nature) may indeed 
give rise to medical cures and treatments (e.g. for Parkinson ' s and 
Alzheimer ' s diseases and certain spinal cord injuries) which are of benefit 
to society. Clearly, the panel believed that the risk that new abortions 
would be caused by the availability of HFTTR was acceptably low and that 
the promised medical benefits outweighed that risk. What exists here is an 
unfortunate example of proportionalist reasoning which attempts to 
measure the value of human lives lost against the promised benefits of 
HFTTR. The truth of this was grasped by the U.S. Assistant Secretary for 
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Health when he recognized that the risk that one more unborn life would be 
taken was too high a price to pay fOor such benefits: " If just one additional 
fetus were lost because of the allure of directly benefiting another life by 
the donation of fetal tissue, our department would still be against federal 
funding ... ,,32 (Predictably, Childress rejects the " moral seriousness" of this 
claim and instead blames the increase in abortions on those who fail to 
provide sex education, contraceptive and psychosocial support for pregnant 
women.) Indeed, there is much to suggest that the risk to unborn life from 
abortion-related H FTTR is far greater than simply one more abortion. 
Despite the panel's high-minded aversion to the sale or purchase of fetal 
tissue, the indications are that trafficking in such tissue has already become 
widespread and can only increase as governments and ethical bodies confer 
approval on the process itself (albeit for "non-profit" purposes). Arkes 
remarks that even when state laws may forbid the expl icit "sale" of tissue, 
" it will still be necessary to pay for the procedures and administration, and 
the transactions may be described . .. as "renditions of service ' " .13 with 
clinics offering cheaper abortions in exchange for much needed fetal 
material. 
Former abortion doctor (turned pro-life activist) Bernard 
Nathanson has observed that "a mother may not sell her aborted fetus. but 
that will be no bar to other economic benefits disguised as part of the 
procedure (just as happens with ' free-markef adoptions now).,, 14 Childress 
admits that under the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA - which 
forbids the "sale" of fetuses under a 1988 amendment), provision is made 
for the reimbursment of abortion clinics for expenses incurred in collecting 
fetal tissue. This gives rise to "some uncertainty" as to whether the clinic 
"can then reduce the price of the abortion. thereby passing the earnings on 
to the pregnant woman.,,35 In his autobiographical work The Hand of God, 
Nathanson reminds his readers that the cost of fetal tissue therapy (for 
Parkinson's disease to take but one example) would be far from cheap. 
Requisite procedures must include screening of patients for their suitability 
for the technique, carrying out of abortions, icing and transportation of 
freshly-aborted fetuses, examination of fetal tissues, procedures connected 
with the transplant operation itself, and follow-up diagnosis. The estimated 
cost of such a procedure would be at least $50,000 and there could be as 
many as 5 million potential recipients on the waiting list, yielding a total 
cost of $250 billion. He concludes that this is ample incentive for a 
massive increase in the marketing of human fetuses and that it would be 
"preposterous to believe that a ban on ' commercialization ' of fetal ti ssue 
would (a.) remove the profit motive from this technology, (b.) reduce the 
demand for the technology , [or] (c.) . .. sanitize the technology ethically.",6 
It is clear that this testimony, from a doctor who reaped substantial 
August, 1999 29 
financial rewards from the abortion industry himse lf, represents a more 
sanguine, rea li stic assessment of the potential hazards of fetal tissue 
transplants than the overly optimisti c hopes of the HFTTR panel. In 
addition , Professor Ronald Munson points out that the 1988 amendment to 
NOTA, referred to above, could eas ily be repealed if further research into 
fetal cell therapy proves success ful :17 It should be noted that thi s unease 
does not come from pro-life circles alone. Kate Michaclman of the 
National Abortion Rights Action League has already declared that he sees 
"a potential for the abuse of women in thi s whole thing.,,18 It remai ns clear 
that only strict legal and ethica l disapproval of abortion-related HFTTR can 
prevent the specter of a worldwide market in the harvest ing of fetu ses. 
Unfortunately, the panel appeared singularly unwilling to convey thi s 
di sapprova l. 
Morally Acceptable Methods of Tissue Collection? 
In view of the danger posed to unborn life by the many illicit ways 
of collecting fetal tissue, is it possib le to speak of alternative, morally 
just ifiable ways of doing so? Dr. Maria Michejda, who has done extensive 
research on miscarried fetuses at Georgetown University, believes it is. 
She argues that, although the research so far has been disproportionately 
biased in favor of abortion-produced fetal ti ssue, there are clear reasons for 
using tissue from miscarri ages. One of these is the fact that "tissue 
harvested from electively aborted fetuses [i s] hi ghly contaminated (75%) 
due to the methods of abortive interve ntion and the rapid ex pUlsion of the 
fetus with the resulting rupture of the fetal abdominal wa ll and other 
surface areas.,,·19 Furthermore, because miscarriages can occur at any time 
during pregnancy, they prov ide better examples of ti ssue from all periods 
of gestation than cells from abortions, most of whic h are performed in the 
first trimester. Based on her studies conducted into fetal ti ssue 
procurement, Dr. Michejda also believes that ti ssue obta ined from 
miscarriages will prove in the long run to be more med ica lly viab le than 
aborted ti ssue. Predicting that the advent of abortion drugs will diminish 
the availability of electively aborted ti ssue, she asserts that the time is right 
to establi sh a collection network devoted exclusively to harvesting fetal 
tissue from miscarriages. Moreover, Pres ident Clinton' s 1993 li fting of the 
moratorium on fetal ti ssue research and the concom itant restoration of 
federal funding for such research would seem to highlight the need for a 
systematic deve lopment of a morally lic it method of ti ssue co llec ti on as a 
way of reducing the demand for abortion-related ti ssue. While thi s 
collection may be morally permiss ible because of its non-reliance on the 
abortion procedure, it is ev ident that great caution must still be exerci sed in 
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the establishment and maintenance of fetal tissue "banks ." Dr. Michejda 
believes that " fetal tissue transplantation offers many exciting, therapeutic 
prospects,,40 and the quest for morally acceptable alternatives to abortion-
related transplants may indeed present to the scientist many fascinating 
avenues of research. Nevertheless, in a society and industry dominated by 
abortion advocates, stringent standards must regulate the approval of such 
tissue banks in order to prevent the semblance of a corresponding approval 
of a "harvesting" mentality. Dr. Michejda accepts the need for such 
controls on sound bioethical grounds which would regulate such practices. 
These controls would have to take account of the fact that the growth of 
tissue banks is not immune from the influence of market forces which tend 
to commercialize anything with a cost value. In addition, one would have 
to examine critically the potential of such storage to create a demand which 
may, because of some future shortage, seek its corresponding supply 
elsewhere in less ethical circumstances. Noted moral theologian Fr. 
Ronald Lawler poses this important question: "Is there much likelihood 
that ... the demand for fetal tissue would be so great that there would be 
almost unanswerable demands for fetal tissue, far more than could be 
satisfied by miscarriages?,,4 1 While accepting that the goods pursued in 
research are very great, he urges any prospective researcher to bear the 
following in mind: " the fact that great goods may be reached by such a 
project does not finally determine that it is a good one.,,42 
Conclusion 
Dr. Michejda observes that "the recent rapid progress in biological 
sciences, and in the new therapies, which emerged from them, has moved 
ahead of the currently accepted ethical guidelines.,,43 It is therefore 
imperative that the new ethical and moral guidelines do not merely attempt 
to "catch up" with new therapies but critically examine them, both for their 
immediate effects and the impressions of approval which they convey to 
society. In this respect the Church , with its deeply-rooted understanding of 
the integrity of the human body from conception until death (and after 
death), seems uniquely suited to the task of keeping in view before the 
medical and ethical communities the inestimable dignity of man and the 
respect which he deserves as they seek to formulate their guidelines. Fr. 
Ronald Lawler' s observations are again insightful in this regard : " For love 
requires both that we act out of generous love, seeking to help others 
flourish in good, and also that we pursue what is good in ways that do no 
intrinsically evil deeds, nor bring about irresponsibly measures of harm that 
in the circumstances we have a duty not to bring about."44 In this dual 
action, then, lies the essence of true Christian charity, which must of 
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necessity be the cornerstone of any ethical framework governing the use of 
fetal tissue transplants. Only in this way can these tran plants truly serve 
the flourishing of human goods by respecting the intrinsic dignity of the 
donor while simultaneously demonstrating compassionate concern for the 
alleviation of human suffering. Failure to recognize thi s can only serve to 
reduce persons, both donor and recipient, to the humiliating status of 
"producer" and "consumer" and to ultimately degrade the nobility of 
scientific research itself. 
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